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The death of a loved one is often an ordeal and a tragedy for those who witness it, as death is not merely the end
of a life, but also the end of an existence, the loss of a unique individual who is special and irreplaceable. In some
situations, end-of-life signs, such as agonal gasps, can be an almost unbearable “sight” because the physical manifestations
are hard to watch and can lead to subjective interpretation and irrational fears. Ethical unease arises as the dying patient
falls prey to death throes and to the manifestations of ebbing life and the physician can only stand by and watch. From
this point on, medicine can put an end to suffering by the use of neuromuscular blockade, but in so doing life ceases
at the same time. It is difficult, however, not to respond to the distress of loved ones and caregivers. The ethical problem
then becomes the shift from the original ethical concern, i.e. the dying patient, to the patient’s loved ones. Is
such a rupture due to a difference in nature or a difference in degree, given that the dying patient remains a
person and not a thing as long as the body continues to lead its own life, expressed through movement and
sound? Because there cannot be any simple and unequivocal answer to this question, the SRLF Ethics Commission is
offering ethical reflections on end-of-life signs and symptoms in the intensive care setting, and on the use of
neuromuscular blockade in this context, with presentations on the subject by two philosophers and members of
the SRLF Ethics Commission, Ms Lise Haddad and Prof Dominique Folscheid. The SRLF Ethics Commission hopes
to provide food for thought for everyone on this topic, which undoubtedly calls for further contributions, the
aim being not to provide ready-made solutions or policy, but rather to allow everyone to ponder this question
in all conscience.
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It is the tension between the natural side of death and
what death contributes to the meaning of life that is
today at the heart of debates in France on the end of
life. In some situations, end-of-life signs, such as agonal
gasps, can be an almost unbearable “sight” because the
physical manifestations are hard to watch and can lead
to subjective interpretation and irrational fears. Ethical
unease arises as the dying patient falls prey to death
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on, medicine can put an end to suffering by the use of
neuromuscular blockade, but in so doing life ceases at
the same time. It is difficult, however, not to respond to
the distress of loved ones and caregivers.
In this review the Ethics Commission of the Société
de Réanimation de Langue Française (SRLF Ethics
Commission) submit ethical reflections on end-of-life
signs and symptoms in the intensive care setting, and
on the use of neuromuscular blockade in this context,
with presentations on the subject by two philosophers
and members of the SRLF Ethics Commission, Ms Lise
Haddad and Prof Dominique Folscheid.an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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Part 1
The point of view of the SRLF ethics commission
End of life: a source of ethical tension Progress in sci-
ence and technology in recent decades, such as that
made in medicine, has helped considerably to improve
the living conditions and health of the populations of
the industrialised countries, enabling people to reach a
greater age and to live longer, quite often in full posses-
sion of their physical and cognitive faculties. Yet this
progress has not intrinsically altered our perception of
death, except to make it more unacceptable. Although
death is seen as a natural phenomenon, part of the nor-
mal order of things, it is often an ordeal and a tragedy
for those who witness it, as death is not merely the end
of a life, but also the end of an existence, the loss of a
unique individual who is special and irreplaceable. Death
is thus experienced sometimes as an injustice, an out-
rage, whatever ideas, representations, and beliefs are
held on what happens to the person after death, whether
death is seen as annihilation or not, as an enigma, a
mystery, a passage, a metamorphosis… For many people,
whether or not death has meaning depends more on the
sense, or lack of it, accorded to life, in accordance
with their religious, spiritual or philosophical views. The
perception of death differs according, for example, to
whether life is held to have no meaning unless it is lived
with full possession of all physical and mental faculties,
or rather that it is part of a greater whole that includes,
for example, an afterlife, which gives transcendent mean-
ing to the hardships of the life that is coming to an end.
It is the tension between the natural side of death and
what death contributes to the meaning of life that is
today at the heart of debates in France on the end of life.
Medicine obviously is not immune to this tension. It re-
sponds to the tension through a form of prudential
wisdom. Because medicine above all relates to human
existences prey to diseases that may be seriously debili-
tating, life-threatening or life-ending. In the struggle for
life, it is medicine’s task to preserve the conditions of a
life sufficiently viable to give rise to a veritable existence,
and not to seek to avoid death indifferent to the condi-
tions of the existence that ensues. It was in this spirit
that the SRLF made its recommendations of 2002 on the
withholding and withdrawal of treatment in intensive
care [1]. These recommendations were updated in 2009
[2] and were fundamental in the drawing up of Leonetti’s
law on the rights of patients and the end of life (No.
2005–370 of 22 April 2005). In 2010 an end-of-life is-
sues group was tasked, among other things, with review-
ing the state of knowledge on end-of-life conditions and
related healthcare practices and with bringing to the
public debate objective and reliable data on the reality of
end-of-life situations in France. Once again it was thesame spirit that drove the recent public debate led by
Professor Didier Sicard, Honorary President of the French
National Ethics Committee, who was asked by the French
President to review end-of-life issues, with a view to draw-
ing up a draft law on the end of life and palliative care.
Particular case of end-of-life signs and symptoms in the
intensive care unit
The laws in place provide a framework sufficient to an-
swer the vast majority of medical and ethical problems
that intensivists are likely to encounter in end-of-life sit-
uations. It is important here to remember the recom-
mendations of the SRLF [2], the Code of Medical Ethics
(Article 38) and the Penal Code (Article 221–1), which
stipulate that in end-of-life situations “the physician does
not have the right to cause death deliberately”. Most of
the time in intensive care, death occurs quite quickly
once treatments are ineffective or are withdrawn because
they are “futile”. In certain situations, withdrawal of
treatment, particularly mechanical ventilation, can trig-
ger gasping respiration, which can be a distressing sight,
particularly as it may in some cases last for hours. End-
of-life signs and symptoms pose a difficult problem,
through how they are seen, interpreted and repre-
sented, notably in terms of possible suffering experi-
enced by the patient. Faced with a patient prey to
disturbing manifestations of a prolonged dying process,
those present (caregivers and loved ones) are confronted
by their own powerlessness and finiteness. And the atti-
tude of the healthcare team is rarely unequivocal. So
what is to be done? Shorten by any means, once all
forms of sedation and analgesia have proven ineffective,
the last convulsions, which are often seen as violent
manifestations of a body locked in a final battle against
certain and imminent death, when consciousness is
doubtless no longer there? Or instead respect this ul-
timate moment of life, this unique and singular time
that everyone should be able to live through, without
having their last moments of life purloined, whatever
the cost to loved ones and caregivers?
In this context, Perkins and Resnick [3], in an article
published eleven years ago, clearly posed the question of
the use of neuromuscular blockade to end the most ex-
treme end-of-life signs, the gasps of agonal respiration,
which are a source of intolerable distress for loved ones.
Perkins and Resnick’s article followed on from previous
publications which questioned the use of muscle relax-
ants in the practice of withdrawing ventilation from
mechanical ventilator–dependent patients for whom the
decision has been taken to stop intensive care [4-6]. In
these earlier publications, the authors firmly condemned
the use of muscle relaxants (devoid of sedative or analgesic
effect) initiated just before withdrawal of mechanical venti-
lation with the sole aim of suppressing impending terminal
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tient. They deemed this practice ethically indefensible and
likened it to a form of euthanasia. The authors reaffirmed
their opposition to intention to cause death. They even
proposed that, for patients already under neuromuscular
blockade for therapeutic reasons when the decision is taken
to withdraw care, the administration of muscle relaxants
should be stopped and their effect allowed to wear off com-
pletely before withdrawing ventilatory support, so as not to
jeopardise any chance of survival the patient may have. On
the other hand, the same authors did not exclude the possi-
bility of withdrawing mechanical ventilation if paralysis
persists after discontinuation of neuromuscular blockers, in
the single case where the probability of the patient surviv-
ing withdrawal of ventilation, in the absence of neuromus-
cular paralysis, is reckoned to be nil. Whatever the context,
the authors stressed the importance of suitable sedation-
pain relief. However, the problem posed by prolonged
gasping after withdrawal of ventilatory support was not
addressed.
Perkins and Resnick [3] report the cases of two young
patients, notably that of a 14-year-old girl with a neuro-
muscular disease who was admitted to intensive care
because of respiratory distress following pneumonia and
was mechanically ventilated at the express request of
her parents. Three weeks later, faced with the patient’s
complete dependence on mechanical ventilation and her
clearly and repeatedly expressed refusal of ventilatory
support, and after numerous discussions with those con-
cerned, the medical team decided to remove ventilatory
support and the patient was extubated. She died the
same day surrounded by her loved ones, but before
dying she experienced gasping respiration for 13 minutes
despite increasing doses of morphine. At a meeting
several months later, the mother said that she wished
she had not seen her daughter gasping, that she was
convinced that her daughter had suffered and that in her
dreams she frequently relived her daughter’s last unbear-
able moments.
In the other case a man of 18 had an untreatable
neurological disease manifesting as severe dystonia and
spasms so severe that endotracheal intubation was per-
formed to palliate respiratory distress. Treatments (bac-
lofen, benzodiazepines, narcotics) failed to control the
spasms and prevented ventilator weaning. The parents sub-
sequently asked for mechanical ventilation to be stopped.
After extubation, aggressive use of baclofen, benzodiaze-
pines, narcotics, and barbiturates controlled the muscle
spasms and respiratory obstruction. But these treatments
proved ineffective once gasps started. The patient was
in a coma and had apnoea for 30 to 60 seconds, inter-
rupted by agonal breaths, for 40 minutes. The father
repeatedly asked: “Isn’t there anything else you can
give him? He is suffering”.The authors therefore re-examine an essential ethical
principle of medicine enunciated by Hippocrates: “the
physician does not have the right to induce death delib-
erately” (Article 38 of the Code of Medical Ethics and
Article 221–1 of the Penal Code) and propose that,
in certain circumstances, in well-sedated patients who
have received well-managed palliative care but in whom
agonal gasps are intractable, that the administration of
muscle relaxants can be envisaged to suppress the
gasping response if it is poorly tolerated by loved ones,
so as to ensure a “serene” death. This position elicited
numerous reactions against the use of muscle relaxants
to suppress gasping [7,8]. However, among the many
arguments advanced by Perkins and Resnick, two are
particularly worthy of our attention since they lie at
the heart of the dilemma facing caregivers. The first
relates to what a patient may or may not feel in the
gasping phase of the dying process, while the second
concerns the obligation felt by caregivers to alleviate
the distress experienced by the patient’s loved ones for
whom the suffering perceived in the gasping respir-
ation becomes intolerable.
Is the patient suffering during agonal respiration?
Gasping respiration is the last phase in the dying
process. It is irreversible and always followed by death.
Before this, consciousness may fluctuate and the patient
may or may not alternate between phases of coma, con-
fusion, or agitation. Sensory perception is usually pre-
served and, if he can still communicate, the patient may
suffer from visual or auditory hallucinations. There may
be laryngeal stridor, bronchial rales, or excessive respiratory
secretion. Respiration is more or less effective, blood pres-
sure varies, and severe diarrhoea may occur, indicating
ischaemia of the digestive tract. All of these signs should be
treated appropriately, or better still anticipated and pre-
vented by specific care [9]. Preterminal gasping signifies
that death is imminent (hours or minutes). This singular
moment is defined by a deep coma, accompanied by signs
of decerebration, decortication, and loss of perception.
Consciousness is lost and there are no longer signs of emo-
tion [10,11]. The observed clinical signs, such as myoclonic
jerks and gasps, which are also described as terminal
apnoea, are linked to cerebral anoxia. Gasps are therefore a
physiological response to hypoxaemia. They are reflex
movements common to all mammals that originate in the
medulla of the central nervous system. Gasping is an auto-
resuscitative mechanism inasmuch as it increases venous
return and cardiac output, and raises aortic pressure as well
as coronary perfusion pressure [12]. In various animal
species, gasps only occur with deep hypoxaemia when the
partial pressure of oxygen drops to below 5 to 15 mmHg.
Gasping indicates approaching death. Scientifically, every-
thing suggests that gasping patients do not feel pain or
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evidence of residual consciousness. Some authors consider
that all medications, including sedatives and analgesics, are
useless and disproportionate at this stage of the dying
process [10]. It is also admitted that increase of the analge-
sics and sedatives usually administered to patients in the
terminal phase in intensive care to a dose sufficient to abol-
ish all pain, and perhaps even consciousness, would not
suppress the more dramatic manifestations of gasping. Only
muscle relaxants can suppress gasping respirations [3,8]. It
is clear that at this stage of the dying process, medication
offers nothing and should give way to support not only of
the dying patient, but also of the patient’s loved ones.
Gasps in the terminal phase as witnessed by loved ones
and caregivers
This moment of the death process is always hard for
loved ones, but also for caregivers. It starkly confronts
everyone with the realities of finiteness and death. It is a
source of tension and anxiety exacerbated by interpret-
ation of agonal respiration, by projections, and by the
meaning that the onlookers give to the death scene
played out before their eyes. Even more complex and
troubling is that end-of-life signs (such as tears), which
are only bodily reflexes, were a few instants before an
expression of pain, of discomfort, of sadness or suffering
that justified the therapeutic act. In the continuum of
the dying process and the care that accompanies it, how
can we be certain that the observed loss of consciousness
and perception is a sign of entry into the terminal phase or
of the effectiveness (excessive even) of sedation-analgesia?
The occurrence of gasping, however, should not raise
doubts in the clinician’s mind. An imperative for all care-
givers seeking to make the unbearable more tolerable is to
explain, describe, and inform so as to shed light on this de-
mise and to inscribe it in the natural process of life. In this
context, the perception by loved ones of the feelings of
caregivers regarding gasps, of a perceptible awkwardness of
personnel ill at ease or on the contrary more “supportive”
and able to speak of what is happening as a troubling but
natural phenomenon, would also contribute to a greater ac-
ceptance (or not) of these end-of-life signs [13]. Likewise,
the words used to describe gasps—like the “agony of agonal
respiration”—should be chosen carefully as they have highly
negative connotations and are associated in our minds with
something greatly painful suggestive of suffering. Whatever
means the health care team employs to render the intoler-
able more tolerable, there remain situations that are harder
than others, and families and caregivers who cannot be
comforted. For the time of dying is not experienced in the
same way by loved ones and health care teams, particularly
if it is prolonged. Whereas most caregivers see dying as nat-
ural, conscious that it proceeds through different phases
and lasts as long as it must, for loved ones dying is felt tobe interminable, an eternity all the more hard to endure as
for them it makes no sense. How can caregivers not re-
spond to the distress of families for whom the suffering
experienced on witnessing prolonged gasping is added to
the suffering associated with the loss of a loved one? Do
they not have, moreover, an ethical duty, stated by Perkin
and Resnik [2] using the American Institute of Medicine's
definition: “A decent or good death is one that is: free from
avoidable distress and suffering for patients, families, and
caregivers; in general accord with clinical, cultural, and
ethical standards?” [14].
Ethical questioning
Ethical tensions arise from the fact that the physician
cannot alleviate the dying patient’s gasping respiration,
except by relieving it and at the same time curtailing the
life he is witnessing. Medicine is therefore stumped, in-
operative, and yet finds it hard not to respond to what
has become an unbearable suffering of loved ones, and
even of caregivers, who witness the last convulsions of
one of their own in whom they have invested much. In
other words, the ethical problem raised is that of a shift
in ethical aim, which initially targeted the patient and
now focuses on loved ones. Does such a rupture relate
to a difference in kind or a difference in degree, given
that the dying patient remains a person who cannot be
reduced to a thing, despite appearances, a body which
continues to lead its own existence, to manifest life by
movement and sound? How then to respond when loved
ones beg for something to be done to end the signs that
they find unbearable and which they often think must be
intolerable for the person from whom they emanate?
At the stage of persistent gasping, only a muscle relax-
ant can act effectively on rales, hiccups and convulsions
and bring to an end the sounds and contortions of a
body struggling against inevitable death. Envisaging the
possibility of neuromuscular blockade invites us to ques-
tion our intentions. Do we wish to control the uncon-
trollable, to preserve mastery over a natural process,
over an eminently human moment that goes beyond the
medical and which escapes our grasp? Even if it means
denaturing it, on the pretext of wanting to bring relief to
loved ones, to medical staff, or to oneself? Is it a sym-
bolic wish to sacrifice the dying person who is already
no longer seen as who he was, but instead as neither
really alive nor dead, neither body nor corpse, in a some-
what utilitarian attempt to procure less disquiet for the
greater number? Laudable though it may be to seek to
comfort those who live through the tragic experience of
the death of a loved one, is not the use of muscle relax-
ants in the terminal phase also a way to spare us from
thinking about dying and especially its clinical implica-
tions? Neuromuscular block used to avoid the confron-
tation with death, as if to escape death, in a way to die
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lessly, without signs, without excess, discreetly. Is it not
on the contrary the last duty of the physician to preserve
what the dying man would consider his dignity, the
dignity of not being seen in this frightful state, and also
to honour the commitment he has made to dying man’s
loved ones to ensure a peaceful death without suffering?
As there are no simple and unequivocal answers to
these questions, the SRLF Ethics Commission thought it
would be interesting to ask two thinkers who are members
of the SRLF Ethics Commission, Ms Lise Haddad and
Professor Dominique Folscheid, to share their thoughts on
terminal signs and symptoms, and in particular the use of
muscle relaxants.
Part 2
The point of view of Ms Lise Haddad, philosopher and
member of the SRLF ethics commission
In intensive care, in hospital, where death most often
occurs, how can we provide both medical and humane
support for the dying?
The end of life, a periphrasis used to suggest expres-
sions with greater connotations, such as demise or death
struggle, should pass like the rest of life, gently, peace-
fully, comfortably and with dignity, as far as is possible.
The difficulty resides in the status of the dying or ter-
minally ill patient: hovering at the fuzzy border between
life and death, we no longer know very well with whom
we are dealing—a patient, someone moving towards
death? How can we qualify the person’s presence, which
is both verifiable and precarious, fleeting, evanescent?
How can we establish a relationship with someone who
no longer seems conscious or is plunged into a state of
altered consciousness, who no longer speaks, who no
longer exchanges looks or gestures?
With the competitive resonances of the etymology of
the word agony (Greek agōniā, contest), the death strug-
gle, the dying person seems to be engaged in a battle
against an invisible enemy, oppressive and torturing: res-
piration becomes increasingly hoarse, irregular and diffi-
cult, the body seems to have lost all autonomy and is
shaken by uncontrolled jerking and twisting. No longer
accessible for an exchange, the dying person offers
those who loved him, the medical team who cared
for him, the physicians who tried to save his life, a ter-
rifying spectacle which confronts everyone with their
doleful powerlessness.
Between life and death, the dying person seems
doomed to complete solitude, and at the same time
experiences his death in an absolutely singular way. In
him is embodied the unique figure of death, his death.
He denies the abstract and hence reassuring character
of human finiteness. The circumstances of death form
the last manifestation of individuality. The end, in aprecise context, at a certain time, with its rales, its hic-
cups, its shudders, happens all the same in a specific
way. The determined form of a person is dimmed and
undone, pointing to imminent oblivion. “The truth is not
death […] only its foreshadowing” explains Bataille. And
Didi-Huberman [15], a contemporary French philosopher
and specialist in aesthetics, who quotes Bataille, explains
that the violence is not in death, “which would lead to the
annihilation of violence itself”. It is not death that is the
most dreadful, but “only its symptom” […]. “A something,
an anything, notably visual, to which is briefly attached the
thing lost, the thing to be lost”. In this same work, Didi-
Huberman, speaks of being engaged in “a work of forms
equivalent to what would be a work of childbirth or of
death”. This reflection on a new way to address the work of
forms that Bataille presents in his journal Documents, ac-
cording to Didi-Huberman, amounts “to implementing the
alteration and declassification of the aesthetic (which is
called taste) into the aesthesic (which is called desire, pain,
disgust), and of the symbol (shareable) into symptom (in-
tractable)”. Here reappears the very source of the aesthetic
in its etymology signifying feeling, perceiving. The violence
visited upon forms, the disfiguring, again reveals the origin
of the aesthetic feeling in pleasure or sorrow, whence the
malaise experienced by the onlooker.
If it is possible to draw a parallel between the aes-
thetic, that is the field of reflection on art, and the po-
tential treatment of the death struggle, it is because the
person we seek to treat with muscle relaxants is no lon-
ger the patient assumed to lack all feeling, or at any rate
to be incapable of showing it, but the witness, in other
words the spectator.
This transition of the patient, who is entering death,
raises questions in the minds of those who witness this
demise. What are we treating? Do we imagine we are an-
swering the patient’s wishes by acting on the form of his
body at this ultimate moment? Are we replacing him by
his loved ones who will preserve and care for his mem-
ory since they now become the sole interlocutors? Are
we also responding to the frustration of the caregivers in
the face of the failure of resuscitation, of “reanimation”,
while avoiding a bed occupancy that is as pointless and
costly as it is distressing? In any case, neuromuscular
block precipitates this difficult and elusive transitional
moment and fixes it in a stiffness that is soothing for
others. This question is perhaps also to be found at the
heart of debates on euthanasia: in the search for a digni-
fied death is outlined the dream of death mastered, for-
mal, retaining a social, a shareable dimension.
The unbearable resides in what is seen: the loss of
form in convulsions, the transformation of articulate and
meaningful words into rales and other organic noises,
the end of the dying person’s control over his body. All
death signifies the end of an irreplaceable individual, the
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painful separation from loved ones. It is not a question
of contesting the heart-rending nature of this moment.
Death cannot be avoided: sooner or later, here or else-
where, it will happen. What then are we seeking to mask
with neuromuscular block, that is by inducing mortal
paralysis, since we suppose that the patient is beyond all
suffering and anguish, which is exactly what is enabled
by neuromuscular block, while it would be very hard to
imagine the same for a conscious person?
From the moment when the patient is no longer
thought of for himself, but rather as an object of repre-
sentation, the landmarks of aesthetic theory are of help
in our attempt to interpret this intolerance of the sight
of the death struggle. More than the patient’s relation
to his own death is now the meaning that this demise
assumes for those who become its witnesses. Walter
Benjamin, the German 20th century philosopher, in his
book The Origin of German Tragic Drama [16], explains
how baroque drama stages the sorrowful as opposed to
the tragic. The tragic shows the suffering of the hero.
The silence of his death reflects his solitude, and his sac-
rifice, “which establishes a new law while respecting the
old”, elicits the respect and recognition of theatre-goers,
who represent the community and are invited to take
part in this confrontation of value systems. The German
baroque stage-form called Trauerspiel suggests through
its root Trauer, mourning, a whole funereal, ostentatious
universe. The spectators no longer are the judges of a
situation embodied by the hero, rather they become the
point of departure of the drama: “Trauerspiel must be
understood from the viewpoint of the onlooker. He sees
onstage situations imposed upon him, an interior place
of feeling. Instead of meaning, he is plunged into the
world of feeling by the staging of the funereal, the insist-
ence on sensitivity, like the inarticulate accents of a wail.
The function of baroque writing full of imagery is less
the drawing back of the veil than almost the stripping
bare of sensitive objects”. The death of the hero in tra-
gedy underscores the exaltation of the individuality of
the hero who, through his acceptance of death, calls into
question the system of values that crushed him. His
death then takes on an abstract meaning, whereas the
insistence, in the baroque, on sensitive manifestations
has the purpose of reproducing the universe of feelings,
which is neither purely theoretical nor wholly irrational.
The body becomes the stage on which is acted out this
conflict between reason and the irrational. Benjamin re-
fers moreover to Descartes’ theory of the passions ac-
cording to which the mind, pure reason, is subject to the
violence of the affects through the intermediary of the
body. Thus, baroque drama, in presenting onstage the
corpses of the characters, does not allude to immortality,
but on the contrary to their “future as corpses”.The emphasis of the stigmata of dying in baroque art,
the insistence on the funereal, the recurrence of appalled
eyes in pictorial representation, tend to produce an
effect on viewers and to illustrate a theory of passions,
by stressing not the sense of a death assumed, but
dispossession of self by the body.
This parallel drawn between a medical reflection and
the theory of the art shows, in this hesitation about
whether to allow or to mask the signs of impending
death, a sort of shift from the symbolic to the real. The
sight of the dying process and of death is not used in a
representation but rather is staged directly on the pa-
tient. Everyone can choose a symbolic reading of the
event when confronted by a painful situation, but here
the work is not done on the symbolic, but operates a
kind of short-circuit. The body itself projects an image
of serenity through an outside and artificial intervention
with no soothing effect on the patient’s feelings. This
spiriting away of death has without doubt the objective
of attenuating the suffering of the patient’s medical team
and family and friends (this conflation creates the rest of
the problem). But how far can we protect others from
the terrible impact of the death of a loved one?
What authorises an act that no longer has any thera-
peutic purpose, nor even is intended to improve the pa-
tient’s comfort? The risk lies in possible subreption by
physicians. Indeed, acting on physiological signs presup-
poses scientific knowledge, or as Alfred Baeumler [17]
explains in The Problem of Irrationality in the Aesthetics
and Logic of the XVIIIth century, “As a subject of sci-
ence, he [man] is no longer the living and real being, but
only a theoretical being. […] subject to the general laws
of the material world”. According to Baeumler, the only
domain where man is recognised as himself, as a “living
individuality”, is aesthetics, because he is only conscious
of his uniqueness in the world of feelings. As it is
effected by physicians at a moment they deem oppor-
tune, medical action intended solely to give form to a
body in death is an aesthetic preoccupation with scien-
tific methods in a person who is still living when the
muscle relaxants are administered. In a sense, by way of
concern for tactfulness, the purpose is to mask the truth
of what is happening: the end of life of an individual,
with no benefit for the dying person.
Neuromuscular block at the end of life seems then to
raise several questions: that of the switch from concern
for the patient to concern for his family and friends,
and in this shift that of the instrumentalisation of the
patient as an object gazed upon; that of the legitimacy
of physicians acting upon the patient solely to soothe
the feelings of the patient’s family and friends. The
physicians’ interest is then concentrated on what is
seen of the patient’s body, by a shift from the symbolic
to the real: they attempt to anticipate and soothe the
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one’s demise.
Part 3
The point of view of professor Dominique Folscheid,
philosopher and member of the SRLF ethics commission
Dying and gasping. For third party ethics? What is a
physician ethically permitted to do when a dying patient
experiences gasping respiration? In describing the situ-
ation, there can only be negatives. No longer is it a ques-
tion of curing, of limiting or stopping treatments, of
providing palliative care or support. And available forms
of sedation are unable to curb the violence of the reac-
tions that occur. From a medical point of view, we are in
the midst of certainty and uncertainty: certainty that the
end is near, that the patient is unconscious, that his con-
dition will not progress to a lasting coma, virtual cer-
tainty that he is not suffering; yet also uncertainty about
the precise moment of death, if it exists, and uncertainty
about the status of the patient who is gasping.
What status?
The words are already suggestive. The patient is no lon-
ger dying but is engaged in the death struggle, the agony.
Agony means a violent struggle or combat, the struggle
that precedes death, from the Greek agōniā, derived
from the verb agein (in Latin agere), which means to
lead, to drive before. The same Indo-European radical ag
is found in to agonise, but also in agenda and agitation.
The dying person then is a fighter. We say of someone
whose life is virtually over that he is struggling with death.
Also that a battle ends because there is no one left to carry
on the fight. But when the battle does not end, who then is
the combatant? In short, in the case of gasping, is there still
someone, a person, who is struggling?
How then can we repeat, with Epicurus, that: Death is
nothing to me, since while I exist, my death is not, and
when my death occurs, I do not exist? A formula that is
flawed in three ways in the case to hand. First, because
the formula’s function, which is to free us of the anxiety
of death, is foiled by the gasping. Second, because the “I”
that is pivotal in the formula seems to have disappeared.
Third, because the either/or formulation, which makes
the line between life and death razor-sharp, a tipping
point outside time, devoid of temporality, seems to give
way to a process that can be spread over time, creating a
grey area. An area that will for ever remain a mystery
(rite known only to the initiated), because there is no
initiate (Greek mystēs), no conscious subject capable of
surviving such an experience and describing it to us
afterwards.
Reconsidering the formulation in terms of Jankélévitch’s
“between two”, we could say that we are between an
“already no longer” (death has done its work) and a “notyet” (death has not reached completion). Something
between post-death and “cadaverisation”. Recall what
Aristotle said of the cadaver: it is no longer really a
body, except in a manner of speaking, because the soul
has flown, the soul being the form of the body, and so
the matter that comprises the body is left to itself,
leading to the disintegration and decomposition of its
elements.
Here insight is to be found in Leibniz’s belief that a
simple substance can only vanish through annihilation, a
composed substance only by decomposition. This offers
an intellectual framework for modern scientific descrip-
tions according to which we die, so to speak, in parts,
organ by organ, the stem cells surviving well after death.
Respiratory gasps can then be considered as forms of
powerless revolt, the desperate struggle of certain parts
of the body at a subordinate level—archaic reflexes.
Consider now what is the death of a human being.
Even if called “natural”—which it is, in the end, in all
cases, whatever its external and occasional causes—it
cannot be reduced to what happens in all other living
beings strictly subject to the cycle of nature, which con-
catenates life and death within a species. As Heidegger
said, strictly speaking only man dies, since the animal
perishes. In fact, the death of a human being is twofold.
On the one hand, the most important in my eyes, it is a
historical event: the demise of a singular being, unique
and irreplaceable, hence a tragedy. On the other hand,
death is the normal outcome of the life of a biological
individual, mortality being an integral part of its natural
quality or character. Which gives us a duality without
any dualism, because while alive a human is one with his
body. Which does not prevent us, quite the contrary in
fact, from considering our body in two distinct ways: the
organic body (German Körper), and the lived body, as
experienced by the person (Leib).
The ethical relation: from two to three
In our uncertainty over the status of the gasping patient,
we can begin by taking two reference points, fixed and
certain. First: however long a terminally ill person is
dying, ie, is still alive, conscious or not, the relations
others have with him are interpersonal. In the words of
Buber, the relations concern the “I and Thou” in the case
of the patient and his loved ones, the physician and the
caregivers, plus the relation with the “It” (of “I and It”)
of the patient which is the subject of health care, and so
the organic body. But for everyone, the person is indeed
there, indissociable from his body, whatever its condi-
tion, and ethics must govern the relations that we main-
tain with the person. Second: once death has done its
work, we slip into a quite distinct issue. The person has
been erased, leaving just a corpse which is no longer
really a body, but a pure “It”, reduced to a thing among
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pathologic study, for sampling, for whatever else. Logic-
ally, ethics becomes mute. And yet we find shocking and
inadequate the response of Heraclitus, who advised the
Ephesians to throw corpses out with the rubbish. For
while a corpse is no longer a body as such, since it has
been deserted by its form, it remains one for others.
A distinction has to be drawn between two sorts of
forms: the animating principle (Greek morphē), which has
disappeared, and the external configuration (in Greek
schēma, in German Gestalt), which is maintained. The
corpse is not then someone’s waste, but his mortal remains,
that is his external configuration, residual but devoid of its
animating principle, hence of life. The term “remains” is
suggestive of the skin shed by an animal that moults. It is,
of course, no longer the body itself or the flesh, but it still
bears the traces of flesh and is seen as such by others. For
what makes a person’s humanity is in very large part the re-
lations he had with other people, elements intertwined in-
separably with the physical body, while the person was
living. What subsists of the body which is no longer a body
is therefore paradoxically the flesh, for the investment that
constitutes it is also ours. The family, loved ones, friends,
then in a way become repositories and bearers of a part of
the flesh of the deceased, in his stead. The deceased more-
over keeps his name, his family ties, and still permits the
forging of a memory of a singular history. This is why we
honour a dead person, render homage to his virtues and
actions, take care of his mortal remains, restore them after
medical sampling and autopsy.
What can we take from these considerations of a dying
person who is gasping? Once the normal means of calm-
ing the violence have been exhausted, one can obviously
let things run their course and wait. But the situation
can be intolerable for loved ones, caregivers, the phys-
ician himself. Unbearable in human terms, by mimetic
projection onto the patient. Morally unbearable to see a
human being reduced to a subjectless reflex system, to
witness the vain revolt of organs against the body, nature
rising against herself without for all that inventing a way,
albeit diminished, to continue to live. In this situation,
loved ones, caregivers, physician become “protagonists”
in the strict sense, thrust forward and called upon to
provide an answer, if possible.
Is it then ethical to try to humanise this death? We are
not speaking of euthanasia, which consists in hastening
the death of a living person. Nor are we speaking of ren-
dering life artificial in order to delay an inevitable death.
We are already in the orbit of death, and what we can
still do there can be understood as a means of combat-
ting death’s own waywardness and restoring its natural-
ness, which is the very definition of medical action.
Except that here we do the reverse of what we would do
ordinarily, which is to preserve life. By acting on an “It”which has become wayward we compensate for the
incapacity of the dying person. A third party, the phys-
ician, then takes the place of the “I” who is absent but
still treated as “Thou”. We are, it is true, only speaking
about signs, but medicine does not give up treating
signs, and uses aspirin, antidepressants, without treating
the root of the problem. By using muscle relaxants we
are clearly not in the doctrine of double effect, but ra-
ther in the single effect, since the harmful effect (death)
is already at work. This would be the reverse double effect:
the worst having happened, it is made less bad.
But there is more, if we take into account others, those
who support the gasping person: loved ones, caregivers
and even the physician, all overwhelmed by the unman-
ageable violence of these terminal signs. One may well
wonder what medicine can do here, for none of these
other people is ill in the sense of disease. They are
though “suffering”, a term that Viktor von Weizsäcker
preferred to “illness”. Indeed they suffer in two ways—in
the form of illness, the subjective suffering, and sickness,
the social suffering. As henceforth the sole bearers of the
deceased’s flesh, in a way they become its substitute. Dif-
ferent from the deceased, yet the same.
In drawing here on Levinas, we are concerned with
third party ethics, for if we consider just the “I-Thou” re-
lation, that of the physician with the patient, we risk for-
getting our obligations to others. This is a primary form
of justice which is an integral part of the ethical relation.
This is indeed an ethical issue, and not one involving free
and equal subjects entering into a contract, since the
persons confronted by the gasping patient are not only
vulnerable, but also “vulnerated”, wounded. The physician
is therefore ethically obliged. As Levinas said, “the other’s
need, and not his freedom, obligates me in my freedom”.
Perhaps one day it will be proved that a patient in this
state is already dead. Since the invention of brain death,
everything seems possible. If this were to happen, muscle
relaxants would pose no problem. Medicine would be noth-
ing more than embalming the patient, but would nonethe-
less fulfil its role towards others.
In the uncertainty that remains, we find ourselves in a
situation very close to that which prevails in terminal
sedation. The link between the two would then be sleep,
the person’s last sleep. From an ethical standpoint, there
is nothing shocking about this since it would readmit an ex-
ceptional situation into the human community. All the de-
ceased, whatever the manner of their death, find peace in
this type of sleep. Let us not forget that the word cemetery
comes from the Greek koimētērion, meaning “sleeping
chamber”.
Conclusions
The SRLF Ethics Commission hopes to enrich the thoughts
of everyone on a subject that without any doubt calls for
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http://www.annalsofintensivecare.com/content/4/1/17other contributions, the aim here not being to provide
ready-made solutions, or even orders, but to empower
everyone to think in all conscience.
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